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Industry  incumbents  frequently  delay  entry  into  emerging  technical  subfields,  fearing  product 
cannibalization  and  uncertain  investment,  and  enter  only  after  technical  and  market  uncertain- 
ties  have  subsided.  We  predict  that  many  incumbents,  particularly  stronger  firms,  will  participate 
in  alliances  with  other  firms  before  their  standalone  entry.  The  alliances  will  be  used  to  realize 
part  of  the  value  of  specialized  assets  and  to  gain  information  about  the  emerging  products  and 
markets.  We  support  the  predictions  with  evidence  from  the  US.  market  of  the  medical 
diagnostic  imaging  industry. 
1.  Introduction 
In  most  product-based  industries,  the  strongest  competitive  factor  is 
product  change  [Schumpeter  (1942);  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)].  For  firms  in 
these  industries,  the  key  strategic  issues  are  likely  to  be  innovation  and 
appropriating  the  returns  from  innovation  [Teece  (1986)],  rather  than  price 
and  quantity  determination  for  a  stable  set  of  products.  When  a  new 
technical  subfield  of  an  industry  emerges,  a  firm  operating  in  the  industry 
must  decide  whether  to  introduce  the  new  products,  when  to  do  so,  how  to 
acquire  necessary  knowledge,  and  how  to  lever  the  value  of  its  existing  assets 
in  the  new  segment  of  the  industry  [Mitchell  (1989)l.l 
Correspondence  to:  Will  Mitchell,  University  of  Michigan,  School  of  Business,  Ann  Arbor,  MI 
48109-1234,  U.S.A. 
*We  would  like  to  thank  two  anonymous  referees  for  their  many  useful  suggestions. 
‘We  define  an  industry  as  a  group  of  firms  which  manufacture  products  having  ‘reasonable 
interchangability  of  use  or  cross  elasticity  of  demand’  [U.S.  Supreme  Court  (1964,  p.  76)].  This 
definition  encompasses  both  direct  substitutes  and  products  which  are  not  direct  substitutes  but 
which  enjoy  purchase  complementarity,  that  is,  are  linked  in  buying  habits.  The  ‘Brown  Shoe’ 
Supreme  Court  decision  cited  above  used  the  latter  criterion  to  find  that  men’s  shoes  and 
women’s  shoes  were  in  the  same  market.  Similarly,  magnetic  resonance  and  x-ray  imaging 
equipment  are  not  exhaustive  substitutes  in  use,  but  a  buyer’s  experience  with  x-ray  equipment 
is  likely  to  influence  the  decision  to  purchase  magnetic  resonance  imaging  devices.  A  technical 
subfield  of  an  industry  [Mitchell  (1989)]  is  a  set  of  products  which  draw  on  a  distinct  knowledge 
base  [Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)]. 
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Many  studies  have  investigated  the  incentives  that  drive  industry  leaders 
to  invest  in  product  development  and  to  vary  the  introduction  time  of  new 
products  resulting  from  such  development.2  The  general  conclusions  are 
that  industry  leaders  have  incentives  to  invest  in  major  product  development, 
may  or  may  not  invest  as  much  as  newcomers,  and  are  likely  to  introduce 
new  goods  only  after  industry  entrants.  Although  the  theoretical  studies  have 
succeeded  in  explaining  some  empirical  phenomena,  they  have  either  contra- 
dicted  or  ignored  others,  The  problems  have  been  caused,  in  part,  by  most 
researchers’  having  conditioned  their  conclusions  on  fairly  restrictive  circum- 
stances  -  difficult-to-imitate  innovation,  industries  made  up  of  similar  firms, 
and  quantifiable  risk  -  so  that  the  applicability  of  findings  has  been  limited. 
In  addition,  only  recently  have  researchers  begun  to  study  the  implications  of 
different  interorganizational  alliances  used  to  acquire  the  know-how  needed 
to  take  part  in  innovation-based  competition  and  realize  the  value  of  existing 
assets  when  applied  to  new  uses. 
In  this  paper,  we  examine  interorganizational  alliances  used  by  incumbents 
of  the  diagnostic  imaging  industry  to  expand  into  new  technical  subtields  of 
the  industry.  The  context  of  the  study  is  an  industry  in  which  core  product 
innovation  tends  to  be  major,  but  necessary  supporting  assets  retain  their 
value  through  generational  changes.  In  the  context  of  the  Abernathy  and 
Clark  (1985)  transilience  map,  such  cases  may  be  referred  to  as  low- 
transilience  innovation,  that  is,  core  product  changes  which  do  not  ‘leap 
across’  [Kirkpatrick  (1983,  p.  1371)]  existing  supporting  assets.  Common 
examples  of  such  innovation  are  found  in  the  consumer  electronics  sector. 
VCRs,  for  instance,  differ  significantly  from  televisions,  yet  their  successful 
commercialization  required  similar  supporting  assets,  such  as  distribution 
systems  designed  for  consumer  electronics,  reputations  with  buyers  of 
electronic  products,  and  the  ability  to  carry  out  incremental  R&D. 
The  literature  on  diversification  [Rumelt  (1974),  Ramanujam  and 
Varadarajan  (1989)],  competitive  strategy  [Hitt  and  Ireland  (1985)]  and 
technological  innovation  [Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (1980),  Reinganum  (1983)] 
suggest  that  incumbents  should  expand  into  related  emerging  subfields  to 
exploit  their  resources.  Doing  so  rapidly  would  provide  a  competitive 
advantage,  and  entering  on  a  standalone  basis  would  allow  the  appropriation 
of  earnings  from  the  venture.  We  argue  that  industry,  firm,  and  technological 
conditions  frequently  dictate  that  incumbents  adopt  a  more  cautious 
approach  to  entry  into  sublields  within  the  industry. 
When  an  industry  incumbent  enters  a  new  product  area  in  which  many 
supporting  assets  retain  their  value,  the  firm  will  often  limit  its  investment 
exposure  and  expand  its  knowledge  sources  by  using  alliances  with  other 
*See,  for  instance,  Dasgupta  and  Stiglitz  (1980),  Gilbert  and  Newberry  (1982),  Reinganum 
(  1983),  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1987),  Lieberman  and  Montgomery  (1988),  and  Conner  (1988). W.  Mitchell  and  K.  Singh,  Incumbents’  use of pre-entry  alliances  349 
firms  before  undertaking  standalone  entry.  We  identify  different  types  of 
alliances  and  predict  that  the  incentives  to  use  alliances  will  vary  with  the 
current  strength  of  the  entrant  and  the  stage  of  development  of  the  product. 
The  degree  to  which  new  supporting  assets  are  required  for  success  in  the 
new  technical  subfield  will  also  influence  the  tendency  to  use  pre-entry 
alliances.  In  addition,  we  test  the  prediction  that  the  tendency  to  use 
alliances  will  vary  systematically  with  the  nationality  of  firm  ownership. 
We  test  our  predictions,  finding  support  for  most,  by  examining  participa- 
tion  in  pre-entry  alliances  by  87  incumbents  of  U.S.  markets  of  the  medical 
diagnostic  imaging  industry  before  the  incumbents’  expansion  into  five  new 
technical  subfields  of  the  industry.  This  industry  consists  of  firms  which 
manufacture  devices  used  by  physicians  and  other  health  care  workers  to 
obtain  information  about  the  internal  functioning  of  the  human  body.  The 
industry  is  suited  for  this  study  because  it  provides  a  relatively  large  sample 
from  a  diverse  set  of  firms  over  a  30  year  period,  during  which  technical  and 
market  change  and  incumbent  expansion  have  been  common.  The  results  can 
be  applied  to  a  wide  set  of  industries,  with  implications  for  competition  in 
industries  facing  the  threat  of  emerging  technological,  market  and  competi- 
tive  challenges. 
2.  Background 
2.1.  Imitability,  different  firms,  and  technical  uncertainty 
Few  real  cases  of  product-change  competition  confirm  to  the  restrictive 
conditions  of  narrow  theoretical  treatments.  Contrary  to  assumptions,  most 
innovation  is  imitable  within  reasonable  horizons  [Mansfield  et  al.  (1981) 
Levin  et  al.  (1988)],  most  industries  contain  very  different  sorts  of  firms 
[Nelson  and  Winter  (1982),  Teece  (1986),  Barney  (1986)  Mitchell  (1989)], 
and  most  major  innovation  is  uncertain  rather  than  risky,  in  Knight’s  (1922) 
sense  of  uncertainty  as  unknowing  and  risk  as  measurable  variation. 
Although  technical  change  may  eventually  take  place  along  an  identifiable 
trajectory  [Nelson  and  Winter  (1982),  Dosi  (1982)],  early  designs  will  be 
varied  [Abernathy  and  Utterback  (1978)]  and  the  future  development  path 
not  at  all  apparent.  In  such  conditions,  the  menu  of  options  from  which  an 
industry  leader  must  formulate  its  innovation  strategy  contains  more  than 
investment  and  timing  choices.  A  firm  must  also  decide  what  products  to 
invest  in,  where  to  acquire  know-how  for  the  product  development,  and  how 
to  acquire  the  knowledge. 
Underlying  the  complexity  of  the  strategic  options  is  the  risk  of  investing 
in  transaction  specific  assets  that  turn  out  to  have  little  value.  Williamson 
(1975,  1985)  argued  that  a  firm  will  benefit  by  integrating  valuable  idio- 
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special-purpose  technology  during  early  development  stages,  when  the  value 
of  such  investment  is  highly  uncertain  [Williamson  (1988)].  Moreover,  given 
organizational  tendencies  to  build  routines  around  past  choices  [Hannan  and 
Freeman  (1977,  1984)  Nelson  and  Winter  (1982)],  there  is  a  significant 
probability  that  by  investing  early  in  a  development  stage,  a  firm  will  lock 
itself  onto  an  inferior  trajectory  [Lieberman  and  Montgomery  (1988)]. 
Although  all  entrants  face  uncertainty,  the  problem  is  particularly  acute  for 
industry  leaders.  Not  only  might  an  incumbent  lose  its  new  investments,  it 
might  damage  past  investments  as  well,  because  successful  new  goods  may 
cut  into  sales  of  existing  products  [Reinganum  (1983,  1985)  Tushman  and 
Anderson  (1986)  Lieberman  and  Montgomery  (1988)].  Moreover,  intro- 
ducing  new  goods  that  fail  may  damage  an  incumbent’s  reputation 
[Leonard-Barton  (1985)]  or  otherwise  reduce  the  value  of  the  supporting 
assets  which  support  existing  products  [Abernathy  and  Clark  (1985), 
Mitchell  (1989)  Mitchell  and  Singh  (1990)].  As  a  result,  empirical  research 
has  found  that  major  innovations  tend  to  be  introduced  by  industry 
newcomers  [Jewkes  et  al.  (1958)  Cooper  and  Schendel  (1976),  Tushman  and 
Anderson  (1986)]. 
But  if  an  innovation  is  successful,  industry  leaders  must  respond  or  lose 
ground  to  the  newcomers.  In  some  cases,  incumbents  choose  not  to  respond 
and  are  replaced,  particularly  when  a  new  product  not  only  substitutes  for 
the  old  good,  but  requires  a  broad  new  set  of  supporting  assets,  which 
Abernathy  and  Clark  (1985)  refer  to  as  high-transilience  innovation,  that  is, 
core  product  changes  which  do  ‘leap  across’  existing  supporting  assets3 
When  supporting  assets  retain  their  value,  incumbents  tend  to  respond  and 
often  continue  to  dominate  the  evolving  industry;  but,  even  in  such  cases,  an 
incumbent  must  make  entry  strategy  choices. 
Although  an  incumbent  would  like  to  delay  its  response  until  the  direction 
and  success  of  the  technical  trajectory  is  apparent,  it  may  not  be  able  to  do 
so.  Strong  potential  competitors  or  strong  potential  for  quick  replacement  of 
the  old  products  by  the  new  may  force  it  to  enter  before  technical  and 
market  uncertainties  have  subsided  [Mitchell  (1989,  1991a)].  For  many 
goods,  technical  participation  at  later  stages  requires  a  cumulative  knowledge 
built  up  by  participating  in  earlier  phases  [Mowery  (1983)  Dosi  (1988)]. 
Therefore,  an  incumbent  often  needs  to  position  itself  during  early  uncer- 
tainty,  in  order  to  jump  onto  a  technological  trajectory  that  will  only  later  be 
defined. 
Even  if  a  firm  enters  a  new  field  several  years  after  it  first  emerges,  many 
uncertainties  will  remain.  The  firm  is  unlikely  to  introduce  a  product 
3This  is  consistent  with  Reinganum’s  (1985)  prediction  that  leading  firms  will  be  replaced  by 
innovative  newcomers,  suggesting  that  the  context  for  such  theoretical  constructions  may  be 
restricted  to  cases  in  which  both  core  products  and  supporting  assets  are  replaced  by 
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identical  to  those  already  in  the  market,  so  that  it  will  be  faced  with  the 
uncertainty  of  innovation.  And,  of  at  least  as  much  importance,  it  faces  the 
uncertainty  of  acquiring  the  knowledge  required  to  compete  in  a  new  field, 
and  incorporating  that  knowledge  into  organizational  routines. 
In  order  to  position  itself,  a  firm  must  acquire  know-how  relevant  to  the 
emerging  product  which  will  often  require  contact  with  other  firms,  because 
of  the  need  to  put  together  many  complementary  assets,  skills  and  tech- 
nologies  [Phillips  (1966),  Jorde  and  Teece  (1989)].  A  firm  may  possess  the 
seeds  of  an  innovation,  while  lacking  the  complementary  capabilities  necess- 
ary  to  refine  the  product  beyond  the  prototype  stage,  and  to  bring  it  to 
market  at  competitive  prices  [Ford  (1985)].  The  methods  that  a  firm  uses  to 
interact  with  other  organizations  will  influence  the  knowledge  it  is  able  to 
acquire,  and  how  much  of  the  value  of  this  know-how  it  will  be  able  to 
realize  [Teece  (1981)  Hamilton  (1983,  Harrigan  (1985a)]. 
There  are  many  means  by  which  firms  can  acquire  information.  Hands  off 
means  include  searching  published  material  and  reverse  engineering.  More 
often,  knowledge  will  be  acquired  through  hands  on  individual  or  organiza- 
tional  contact.  Individual  contact  includes  key  people  in  academe,  research 
laboratories  or  competitor  firms.  Organizational  contact  can  take  place  on  a 
markets  to  hierarchies  continuum,  with  short  term  contracts  at  the  markets 
end  and  integration  through  acquiring  part  or  all  of  a  firm  at  the  hierarchies 
end  [Mitchell  (1991b)l. 
2.2.  Interorganizational  options 
Interorganizational  collaboration  is  increasingly  being  recognized  as  offer- 
ing  a  middle  path  between  the  markets  and  hierarchies  alternatives  of 
organizational  contact.4  Rationales  for  collaborative  ventures  include 
spreading  risk,  increasing  market  power,  sharing  resources,  and  gaining 
organizational  learning  [Pfeffer  and  Nowak  ( 1976)  Powell  (1990),  Contractor 
and  Lorange  (1988)].  Alliances  may  serve  as  surrogates  for  more  permanent 
links,  sometimes  allowing  organizations  to  obtain  the  desired  benefits  of 
collaboration  without  the  added  costs  of  governance  [Williamson  (1975)]. 
Industry  incumbents  seeking  to  expand  may  be  attracted  to  interorganiza- 
tional  alliances  in  order  to  gain  access  to  market  knowledge  and  core 
technical  know-how.5  Acquiring  market  and  technical  knowledge  via  an 
alliance  rather  than  through  standalone  methods  will  frequently  limit  an 
incumbent’s  investments  in  transaction  specific  assets  which  may  later  turn 
out  to  be  valueless  [Williamson  (1988)  Kogut  (1988)].  Different  forms  of 
%ee,  for  instance,  Pointer  et  al.  (1988),  Jorde  and  Teece  (1989),  Astley  and  Brahm  (1989), 
Hamel  et  al.  (1989),  and  Powell  (1990). 
‘See  Harrigan  (1985b,  1987),  Gross  and  Neuman  (1988),  Clarke  and  Brennan  (1988),  and 
Teece  et  al.  (1988). 352  W.  Mitchell  and  K.  Singh,  Incumbents’  use of  pre-entry  alliances 
alliances  -  ranging  from  minority  equity  holdings  to  components  manu- 
facture  to  distribution  of  another  firm’s  products  -  represent  a  menu  of 
collaborative  modes  which  provide  varying  degrees  of  market  and  technical 
knowledge. 
Interorganizational  options  may  also  provide  means  of  realizing  the  value 
of  an  asset  without  investing  in  all  necessary  supporting  assets.  If  an  industry 
incumbent  distributes  another  firm’s  products,  for  instance,  the  incumbent 
not  only  gains  knowledge  about  the  market  for  the  products,  but  gains  part 
of  the  profits  accruing  to  the  goods.  Such  an  option  may  involve  less  risk,  at 
least  in  the  short  term,  than  developing  internal  manufacturing  capabilities. 
However,  alliances  only  rarely  provide  long  term  methods  of  market 
participation.  Governance  and  technical  problems  cause  most  to  break  down 
within  a  few  years  [Harrigan  (1985b)].  In  some  cases,  the  alliance  breaks 
down  because  it  cannot  successfully  produce  or  distribute  goods  and  is 
dissolved.  In  other  cases,  the  alliance  succeeds  in  producing  a  successful 
good,  but  breaks  down  due  to  managerial  disagreement,  legal  problems,  and 
diverging  aims,  so  that  one  of  the  parties  takes  over  the  venture.  Kogut 
(1989),  for  instance,  found  a  70%  termination  rate  among  92  U.S.-based 
manufacturing  alliances,  with  about  40%  of  the  terminations  occurring 
through  dissolution  of  the  venture  and  the  remainder  through  acquisition.6 
Thus,  although  a  pre-entry  alliance  may  provide  lower  risk  than  independent 
participation,  even  a  successful  alliance  will  usually  only  be  a  precursor  to 
standalone  entry. 
In  this  study,  we  examine  the  use  of  pre-entry  alliances  by  industry 
incumbents  which  later  undertook  standalone  entry  into  emerging  technical 
subfields  of  their  industry.  In  order  to  provide  a  context  for  the  study,  we 
next  describe  the  empirical  base.  We  then  present  specific  hypotheses  and 
describe  the  analysis. 
3.  Medical  diagnostic  imaging  industry 
3.1.  Products 
This  study  is  conducted  in  the  context  of  technical  subfields  of  the  medical 
diagnostic  imaging  industry.  The  industry  was  born  with  the  introduction  of 
conventional  x-ray  equipment,  within  a  year  of  Roentgen’s  discovery  of  X 
rays  in  1896.  By  the  early  1980s  six  new  technical  subfields  of  the  imaging 
industry  had  emerged,  as  listed  in  table  1. 
The  first  expansion  of  the  industry  beyond  conventional  x-ray  equipment 
occurred  in  the  early  twentieth  century  with  the  introduction  of  electro- 
6Kogut  does  not  report  a  distinction  between  acquisition  by  one  of  the  parties  to  the  joint 
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Table  I 
Diagnostic  imaging  industry  technical  sublields.” 
Subfield 
Conventional  x-ray 
Electrodiagnostic 
Nuclear  medical 
Ultrasound 
Computed  tomography 
Magnetic  resonance 
Digital  radiography 
Commercial  introduction 
U.S.  Non-US. 
1896  1896 
1911  1911 
1954  c.  1956 
1957  c.  1954 
1973  1972 
1980  1978 
1981  1981 
1988  U.S.  sales 
(S  million) 
600 
200 
200 
500 
500 
500 
400 
“Sales  estimates  are  reported  in  constant  1988  dollars  (S  million),  based  on 
the  Producer  Price  Index  (PPI)  deflator. 
diagnostic  instruments,  including  electrocardiographs  and  electroencephalo- 
graphs.  During  the  1950s  commercial  nuclear  medical  and  ultrasonic 
imaging  instruments  were  introduced  to  medical  practice.  Computed  tomo- 
graphic  (CT)  instruments  were  introduced  during  the  early  1970s.  Commer- 
cial  nuclear  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (NMR  or  MRT)  and  digital 
radiographic  imaging  instruments  were  introduced  in  the  early  1980s. 
The  emergence  of  new  subfields  involved  considerable  market  and  techni- 
cal  uncertainty  [Hamilton  (1982)].  Competition  among  alternate  products 
and  technical  approaches,  and  uncertainty  over  clinical  and  market  accep- 
tance  have  typically  been  great  for  several  years  after  the  initial  emergence  of 
the  subfield.  For  example,  nuclear  medical  and  ultrasound  imaging  only 
achieved  acceptance  in  the  middle  to  late  sixties,  more  than  a  decade  after 
the  products  establishing  these  subfields  first  emerged,  and  did  not  diffuse 
rapidly  until  the  1970s.  Although  recently  emerging  subfields  have  tended  to 
converge  on  a  single  technological  paradigm  more  quickly,  and  have 
achieved  market  and  clinical  acceptance  more  rapidly,  even  these  were 
characterized  by  several  years  of  significant  uncertainty. 
The  market  for  imaging  equipment  grew  slowly  during  the  first  half  of  the 
century,  then  expanded  rapidly  following  the  introduction  of  the  new 
imaging  equipment  during  the  1950s  and  again  as  the  U.S.  medical  market 
expanded  during  the  1970s.  Rapid  technical  advancement  of  imaging  quality, 
both  from  equipment  in  new  subfields  and  improvements  to  instruments  in 
established  subfields,  have  spurred  the  growth.  Annual  imaging  equipment 
sales  grew  from  approximately  $30  million  in  the  early  1950s  to  about  $3 
billion  during  the  late  1980s. 
Technical  shifts  in  each  emergent  subfield  can  be  characterized  as  being 
relatively  low  in  transilience  because,  although  the  core  technology  in  each 
case  represented  a  significant  innovation,  the  supporting  assets  required  to 
commercialize  the  product  were  largely  similar.  For  instance,  many  of  the 354  W.  Mitchell  and  K.  S&h,  Incumbents’  use  of pre-entry  alliances 
reputations,  distributions  and  service  systems,  and  incremental  R&D  capabi- 
lities  that  were  valuable  in  existing  subfields  have  continued  to  be  useful  in 
emerging  subfields.  This  factor  and  the  sales  potential  of  new  subfields  has 
led  many  industry  incumbents  to  expand  into  new  sublields.  At  the  same 
time,  the  growth  of  the  industry  has  attracted  many  new  participants  to  the 
industry. 
Although  supporting  assets  have  retained  their  value  through  each  emer- 
gence  of  a  new  subfield,  there  has  been  some  variation  in  the  degree  to 
which  the  utility  carried  through.  Ultrasound  and  electrodiagnostic  instru- 
ments,  in  particular,  have  required  different  distribution  and  service  systems 
than  products  in  the  other  technical  subfields  of  the  industry,  because  of 
differences  in  market  segmentation.  Conventional  x-ray,  nuclear  imaging, 
CT,  MRI,  and  digital  radiographic  instruments  are  sold  primarily  to 
hospital-based  radiologists.  Ultrasound  and  electrodiagnostic  instruments, 
meanwhile,  have  traditionally  been  sold  to  other  hospital-based  medical 
specialists  and  to  physicians  in  private  practice.  The  ultrasound  and  electro- 
diagnostic  subfields,  therefore,  represent  relatively  high-transilience  cases 
relative  to  the  other  technical  subfields  of  the  imaging  industry. 
3.2.  Concepts  and  definitions 
The  conduct  of  the  study  required  that  boundaries  be  defined  for  the 
geographic  and  product  scope  of  the  market  and  that  levels  of  analysis  be 
chosen.  The  geographic  scope  of  the  study  was  limited  to  the  U.S.  market, 
because  diagnostic  imaging  equipment  distribution  and  service  networks  tend 
to  be  defined  within  national  boundaries.  Manufacturers  of  imaging  systems 
used  for  human  diagnostics  within  hospitals,  outpatient  clinics,  and 
physician’s  private  offices  were  included  in  the  study,  while  producers  of 
dental  and  veterinary  imaging  equipment  were  excluded.  Also  excluded  were 
component  manufacturers  and  firms  that  distributed  other  company’s  pro- 
ducts  without  undertaking  independent  manufacture.  The  analysis  was 
conducted  at  the  parent-firm  level  of  analysis,  so  that  entry  was  recorded 
when  an  organizational  subunit  of  a  corporation,  such  as  a  division  or 
subsidiary,  first  began  to  manufacture  imaging  systems  for  sale  in  the  U.S. 
market. 
In  addition,  it  was  necessary  to  identify  forms  of  pre-entry  interorganiza- 
tional  alliances  commonly  used  in  the  imaging  industry.  An  alliance  was 
defined  as  a  long-term  cooperative  agreement  between  an  incumbent  of  the 
U.S.  imaging  industry  and  another  commercial  firm  operating  in  a  technical 
subfield  of  the  industry.  A  pre-entry  alliance,  meanwhile,  was  defined  as  an 
alliance  formed  before  an  industry  incumbent  entered  the  subfield  in  which 
its  partner  was  operating.  Long  term  was  defined  as  an  agreement  that 
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types  of  alliances  were  identified,  distribution  and  know-how  sourcing 
ventures. 
Distribution  alliances  were  agreements  for  an  industry  incumbent  to 
distribute  imaging  systems  manufactured  by  another  firm,  before  the  intro- 
duction  by  the  incumbent  of  its  own  systems  in  the  new  technical  subfield.  A 
manufacturer  of  x-ray  equipment,  for  example,  might  first  distribute  another 
firm’s  computed  tomography  system,  and  then  undertake  CT  manufacture 
itself.  A  distribution  alliance  permits  an  incumbent  to  realize  part  of  the 
value  of  its  specialized  distribution  system  in  a  new  setting  without  under- 
taking  the  uncertainty  of  direct  manufacturing  entry.  At  the  same  time,  such 
an  alliance  provides  both  access  to  technical  know-how  generated  by  another 
firm  and  an  opportunity  to  learn  about  the  market  for  the  emerging  product. 
Know-how  sourcing  ventures,  meanwhile,  were  cases  in  which  an  industry 
incumbent  acquired  technical  capabilities  from  another  firm  before  the 
incumbent’s  entry  into  a  new  subfield.  Such  alliances  included  joint  ventures, 
minority  equity  investment  by  the  incumbent,  and  long  term  licensing  of 
technology  from  another  firm.  In  other  industries  or  at  other  times,  other 
forms  of  alliances  such  as joint  research  would  likely  be  found. 
Because  alliances  commonly  involve  multiple  motives  and  complex  legal 
and  organizational  relationships,  a  conservative  approach  was  adopted  for 
the  definition  of  alliances.  Multiple  sources  were  employed  to  verify  all 
alliances.  Where  there  was  uncertainty  on  the  nature  of  or  motivation  for  the 
alliance,  the  case  was  discarded  from  the  analysis.’ 
3.3.  Sample 
The  data  for  this  study  were  drawn  from  an  extensive  archival  study  of 
published  and  unpublished  academic,  industry,  business,  and  government 
sources.  The  search  was  supplemented  by  interviews  with  industry  and 
academic  participants.  The  sample  comprised  all  entrants  to  the  nuclear 
imaging,  ultrasound,  computed  tomographic,  magnetic  resonance,  and  digital 
radiographic  subfields  which  had  manufactured  systems  in  any  other  subfield 
of  the  imaging  industry  before  entering  the  new  subfield.’  A  plurality  of  the 
sample  were  firms  with  majority-ownership  based  in  the  United  States,  but 
incumbents  based  in  Europe,  Japan,  and  elsewhere  were  also  included.  In 
‘In  two  cases,  the  incumbent  entered  into  both  distribution  and  know-how  sourcing  alliances. 
Both  of  these  cases  were  categorized  as  distribution  alliances,  on  the  basis  of  first  occurrence.  To 
test  the  impact  of  this  categorization,  the  analysis  was  conducted  with  the  two  cases  classified  as 
know-how  sourcing.  The  results  were  substantially  the  same,  though  the  overall  explanatory 
power  was  weaker. 
‘The  subfields  chosen  are  the  five  which  have  emerged  since  the  1950s  because  comprehensive 
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Table  2 
Sample  profile. 
Number  and  method  of  expansions  by  industry  incumbents 
Subfield  into  which 
expansion  occurred 
Number 
expanded 
Pre-expansion  alliances 
None  Alliance 
Nuclear  medical  10  9  I 
Ultrasound  31  22  9 
Computed  tomography  12  8  4 
Magnetic  resonance  17  9  8 
Digital  radiography  17  13  4 
Total  incumbents  expanding  87  61(70:/,)  26 (30%)” 
Nationality  of  majority 
ownershin 
U.S.  49  (56%) 
European  27  (31%) 
Japanese  10  (12%) 
Other  1  (1%) 
Total  8 7 ( 1  OOo/,) 
“Includes  15  distribution  and  13  know-how  alliances,  which  do  not  sum 
to  total  incumbents  expanding  after  a  pre-entry  alliance  (26)  because  two 
incumbents  used  both  distribution  and  know-how  alliances  before 
expansion. 
total,  there  were  87  entries  by  45  incumbents  into  the  5  new  subfields.  Table 
2  provides  a  profile  of  the  sample. 
4. Hypotheses 
The  earlier  theoretical  discussion  leads  to  several  testable  hypotheses  in  the 
context  of  the  diagnostic  imaging  industry.  Imaging  industry  incumbents 
have  faced  significant  collaborative  incentives.  They  usually  possess  skills, 
resources  and  complementary  assets  such  as  manufacturing  capability,  distri- 
bution  systems,  and  service  and  maintenance  organizations  to  offer  potential 
alliance  partners.  The  incentive  for  incumbents  to  collaborate  is  reinforced  by 
the  trend,  as  in  many  other  industries,  for  advances  in  imaging  technology  to 
come  from  a  variety  of  sources  both  within  and  outside  the  industry  [Frost 
and  Sullivan  (1974,  1982);  Foster  (1986),  Dosi  (1988)].  The  significant  shifts 
of  knowledge  bases  required  to  manufacture  goods  in  new  sublields  and  the 
rapid  pace  of  obsolescence  of  core  products  in  the  imaging  industry  makes 
commitment  to  one  particular  technology,  and  limiting  information  access  to 
in-house  sources  only,  a  high  risk  strategy  [Mitchell  and  Singh  (1990)]. 
One  strategy  for  incumbents  which  wish  to  enter  a  new  subfield  is  to 
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purchases  of  small  firms  for  their  technological  and  innovative  capabilities 
[Doz  (198X)]  has  encouraged  firms  to  enter  into  alliances  as  alternative 
channels  for  obtaining  access  to  required  information  [Wachtler  (1988)]. 
Alliances  may  be  more  suitable  devices  for  incumbents  to  obtain  market 
knowledge  and  technical  know-how  than  either  hierarchical  or  market  means 
[Powell  (1990)],  particularly  in  the  highly  competitive  and  uncertain  environ- 
ment  of  the  health  care  industry  [Pointer  et  al.  (1988)].  Such  alliances  may 
be  less  likely  to  smother  creative  abilities  and  may  reduce  the  costs  and 
difficulties  of  direct  governance  below  those  imposed  by  outright  acquisition 
[Williamson  ( 1975)].9  Pre-entry  alliances  between  incumbents  and  other 
firms  can  therefore  be  expected  to  be  a  common  feature  of  the  imaging 
industry. 
Hypothesis  I.  Industry  incumbents  which  expand  into  new  technical  sub- 
fields  will  frequently  participate  in  pre-entry  interorganizational  alliances. 
A  strong  incumbent  faces  strong  collaborative  incentives.  Part  of  an 
incumbent’s  strength  relates  to  its  industry-specific  characteristics.  The 
stronger  the  industry-related  market  and  technical  position  of  an  incumbent, 
the  broader  its  supporting  assets  and  the  more  it  can  offer  potential  allies. 
Therefore,  it  is  likely  to  attract  the  most  lucrative  offers.  Moreever,  its 
strength  provides  the  ability  to  dominate  a  successful  partnership,  making 
expansion  via  alliances  particularly  attractive  to  it.”  In  addition,  having  the 
most  assets  committed  to  existing  fields  and  possessing  an  established 
reputation,  the  strong  incumbent  also  has  the  most  to  lose  if  standalone 
entry  goes  awry.  In  an  industry  characterized  by  high  failure  rates  among 
entrants  into  new  sublields  [Mitchell  (1991a)],  the  need  for  significant 
idiosyncratic  investments  [Hess  (1987)],  and  high  technical  and  market 
uncertainty  [Hamilton  (1982)  Pointer  et  al.  (1988)],  there  are  particularly 
strong  inducements  for  leading  incumbents  to  enter  via  alliances. 
In  addition  to  industry-related  attributes,  an  incumbent  may  be  strong  in 
terms  of  characteristics  that  are  not  specifically  related  to  any  one  industry 
or  sector.  Greater  financial  resources,  in  particular,  may  allow  a  firm  to 
undertake  ventures  that  a  resource-constrained  business  would  not  be  able  to 
initiate.  We  have  no  strong  prior  case  for  the  differential  impact  of  industry- 
related  strength  and  general  strength  on  the  tendency  to  engage  in  pre-entry 
alliances.  Therefore,  we  will  state  the  hypothesis  simply  in  terms  of  strength, 
‘The  relatively  poor  protection  provided  by  patents  and  copyrights  in  the  imaging  industry 
[Frost  and  Sullivan  (1974,  1982)]  effectively  increases  the  value  of  any  information  obtained 
from  the  ally,  and  provides  yet  another  incentive  for  alliances. 
“‘Despite  the  likelihood  that  the  industry  incumbent  will  eventually  dominate  a  successful 
alliance,  the  possession  of  broad  supporting  assets  will  permit  strong  incumbents  to  attract 
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but  operationalize  it  in  the  analysis  section  as  both  industry  and  general 
strength  so  that  we  can  empirically  distinguish  between  the  effects. 
A  strong  incumbent  also  faces  alliance  disincentives,  particularly  the 
chance  that  a  partially-controlled  partner  may  damage  the  incumbent’s 
current  position  through  bad  technical  or  strategic  choices.  On  balance, 
however,  we  believe  that  the  strongest  incentives  will  favour  collaborative 
arrangements.  The  combination  of  promising  offers,  the  likelihood  of  domin- 
ating  a  successful  alliance,  the  opportunity  to  reduce  idiosyncratic  invest- 
ments  and  mediate  market  and  technical  risks,  and  the  potential  losses 
through  standalone  entry  is  likely  to  result  in  the  strongest  incumbents  being 
over-represented  among  alliances. 
Hypothesis  2.  The  stronger  the  position  of  an  industry  incumbent,  the  more 
likely  it  is  to  participate  in  a  pre-entry  alliance  before  expanding  into  a  new 
subfield. 
Contradictory  forces  also  influence  the  use  of  alliances  at  different  stages  of 
subfield  development.  Firms  which  enter  a  new  subfield  before  market  and 
technical  uncertainty  have  abated  motives  for  early  collaborative  efforts.  On 
the  other  hand,  fewer  potential  partners  with  the  necessary  skills  and 
resources  to  induce  the  incumbent  to  enter  into  a  collaborative  arrangement 
are  available  early  in  subfield  history.  Incumbents  which  choose  early  entry, 
therefore,  may  be  forced  to  enter  through  standalone  methods.  Pre-entry 
alliances  are  likely  to  be  associated  with  incumbents  which  undertake 
independent  entry  relatively  late  in  the  development  of  a  new  technical 
subfield. 
Hypothesis  3.  The  later  its  expansion  into  a  new  technical  subfield  of  an 
industry,  the  more  likely  an  industry  incumbent  will  participate  in  a  pre- 
entry  alliance. 
Although  the  imaging  industry  has  been  characterized  as  having  low 
transilience,  we  noted  earlier  that  the  value  of  ultrasound  and  electro- 
diagnostic  support  assets  carried  through  only  partially  to  the  other  technical 
sublields.  In  the  Abernathy  and  Clark  (1985)  framework,  incumbents  expand- 
ing  into  the  ultrasound  or  electrodiagnostic  subfields  from  the  other  subfields 
(or  into  the  other  subfields  from  these  two  subtields),  would  be  undertaking 
‘architectural’  innovation  in  applying  new  technology  in  new  markets.  These 
firms  would  have  to  develop  their  technical  and  product-related  assets,  as 
well  as  their  supporting  (i.e.,  market-related)  assets  in  order  to  operate  in  the 
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ties  for  its  existing  operations  [Nelson  and  Winter  (1982),  Hannan  and 
Freeman  (1977,  1984),  Prahalad  and  Bettis  (1987)].  In  contrast,  incumbents 
moving  between  nuclear  medical,  computed  tomography,  magnetic  resonance 
and  digital  radiography  would  be  applying  new  technology  in  essentially  the 
same  market  segments,  so  that  existing  supporting  assets  tend  to  retain  their 
value  in  the  new  subfields.  These  innovations  represent  lower  transilience 
moves  relative  to  architectural  innovations. 
This  presents  an  incumbent  of  the  ultrasound  subfield  which  is  considering 
entry  into  the  computed  tomography  subtield  with  a  relatively  higher 
transilience  adjustment  than  a  firm  expanding  from  the  x-ray  into  the 
computed  tomography  subfield.  The  key  differences  between  subtields  in  this 
respect  lie  not  in  their  core  technologies,  which  differ  significantly,  but  in  the 
transferability  of  the  value  of  supporting  assets.  Supporting  assets  are  more 
valuable  for  an  incumbent  moving  between  low  transilience  subfields  than 
they  are  for  a  move  between  high  transilience  subfields.  The  more  valuable 
these  supporting  assets  in  other  subtields,  the  greater  the  attractiveness  of  the 
incumbent  to  its  potential  allies,  and  the  greater  the  possibility  of  alliance. 
The  less  transferable  these  supporting  assets,  the  less  likely  the  alliance. 
The  disincentive  will  be  particularly  strong  for  distribution  alliances,  as  the 
incumbent’s  specialized  distribution  and  service  resources  will  provide  little 
value  to  a  partner.  Indeed,  when  the  value  of  supporting  assets  does  not 
carry  over  into  a  new  subfield,  an  incumbent  will  be  relatively  unlikely  to 
expand  into  it.  For  those  incumbents  which  do  expand  into  the  new  subfield, 
however,  the  incentive  to  undertake  a  pre-entry  know-how  sourcing  alliances 
may  be  just  as  strong  in  the  high  as  in  the  low-transilience  case,  because  the 
need  for  core  technical  knowledge  is just  as  great. 
Hypothesis  4.  (a)  The  more  that  a  new  technical  subfield  requires  new 
supporting  products,  the  less  likely  that  an  industry  incumbent  will  partici- 
pate  in  a  pre-entry  distribution  alliance  before  expanding  into  the  new 
subfield. 
Hypothesis  4.  (b)  The  degree  to  which  a  new  technical  subfield  requires 
new  supporting  products  will  not  be  associated  with  participation  by 
industry  incumbents  in  pre-entry  know-how  sourcing  alliances. 
Because  we  are  investigating  entry  in  a  geographic  American  market  by 
both  U.S.  and  foreign-based  firms,  it  is  possible  that  we  will  find  nationality- 
based  propensities  to  undertake  pre-entry  distribution  and  know-how  sourcing 
alliances.  Foreign  firms  are  sometimes  viewed  as  being  more  likely  to 
participate  in  alliances  than  American  businesses.  Japanese  firms,  in  particu- 
lar,  have  commonly  used  distribution  and  technical  alliances  to  combine  in- 
house  and  external  know-how,  and  have  been  observed  to  employ  alliances 360  W.  Mitchell  and  K.  Singh,  Incumbents’  use  ofpre-entry  alliances 
as  part  of  a  gradual  market  entry  strategy  [Gerlach  (1987),  Kuhn  (1989), 
Mitchell  and  Fiegenbaum  (1990)].” 
Hypothesis  5.  A  majority  American-owned  incumbent  is  less  likely  than  a 
majority  foreign-owned  incumbent  to  participate  in  a  pre-entry  alliance 
before  expanding  into  a  new  technical  subfield. 
The  industry  incumbent  member  of  an  alliance  represents  only  one  end  of 
a  transaction.  In  addition  to  the  incentives  for  incumbents  to  undertake 
collaborative  ventures,  there  must  be  incentives  for  the  partner.  Although 
examination  of  these  incentives  is  largely  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study,  we 
will  also  address  some  of  the  motives  for  an  incumbent’s  partner  to 
undertake  these  ventures. 
5.  Methods 
5.1.  Variables 
Dependent  variables.  Three  variables  recorded  whether  an  industry  incum- 
bent  which  entered  a  new  technical  subfield  of  the  diagnostic  imaging 
industry  had  participated  in  a  subfield-relevant  alliance  before  its  entry.  The 
first  variable  noted  whether  the  incumbent  had  distributed  another  firm’s 
imaging  systems  before  its  entry  into  the  new  subfield.  The  second  variable 
recorded  whether  the  incumbent  had  used  a  know-how  sourcing  alliance 
before  its  entry.  The  third  variable,  a  measure  of  all  alliances,  combined 
distribution  with  know-how  sourcing  alliances.  The  variances  took  the  value 
of  1  if  pre-entry  alliance  was  employed  and  0  if  entry  took  place  without  a 
prior  alliance. 
Covariates.  Independent  variables  were  defined  to  test  the  predictions 
regarding  nationality  of  majority  ownership,  lateness  of  independent  entry, 
retention  of  the  value  of  existing  supporting  assets,  and  incumbent  strength. 
Table  3  presents  summary  statistics  and  the  correlation  matrix  for  the 
independent  variables.  A  dummy  variable  categorization  of  incumbents  as 
American  or  other  was  based  on  the  country  of  origin  of  the  majority- 
ownership  of  the  parent  company. 
The  lateness  of  standalone  entry  was  measured  by  the  duration  in  years 
between  the  emergence  of  a  subfield  and  the  entry  of  the  incumbent,  with  the 
count  starting  at  one  for  an  incumbent  which  entered  during  the  first  year  of 
subfield  history.  On  average,  standalone  entries  tended  to  occur  relatively 
“Although  we  are  examining  expansion  within  the  American  diagnostic  imaging  equipment 
market,  pre-entry  distribution  and  know-how  alliances,  as  we  define  them,  may  take  place 
anywhere.  A  Japanese  firm,  for  instance,  might  distribute  in  Japan  a  CT  imaging  system 
manufactured  by  a  European  corporation  before  undertaking  its  own  manufacturing  entry  to  the 
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Table  3 
Summary  statistics. 
Product-moment  correlations  (IV =  87) 
Independent  variable  Mean  (sd.)  1  2  3  4  5 
1.  Market  share  0.02  (0.03)  1.00 
2.  Corporate  sales  (log  $Million)  5.70  (2.88)  0.48  1.00 
3.  Years  before  entry  10.93  (8.62)  -0.18  -0.13  1.00 
4.  High  transilience  0.4 I  (0.50)  -0.33  -0.28  0.69  1.00 
5.  U.S.  tirm  0.56  (0.50)  0.11  -0.34  0.05  0.22  1.00 
6.  Number  of  previous  alliances  0.40  (0.88)  0.66  0.39  -0.12  -0.28  -0.02 
late  after  the  emergence  of  the  new  subfields,  with  the  average  wait  before 
entry  being  almost  11  years.  In  part,  this  figure  speaks  to  the  caution  with 
which  incumbents  approach  expansion.  However,  the  average  lateness  of 
entry  differed  greatly  across  subtields:  10  years  for  nuclear  medical  imaging, 
21  years  for  ultrasound,  5  years  for  computed  tomography,  5.5  years  for 
magnetic  resonance  imaging,  and  3  years  for  digital  radiography.  These 
periods  are  consistent  with  the  greater  market  uncertainty  that  accompanied 
the  emergence  of  earlier  subfields  and  the  more  rapid  commercial  establish- 
ment  of  the  more  recent  subfields. 
A  c-1  measure  of  relative  transilience  was  based  on  a  firm’s  experience  in 
the  ultrasound  or  electrodiagnostic  subfield.  Entry  into  the  ultrasound 
subfield  by  an  industry  incumbent  lacking  experience  in  the  electrodiagnostic 
subfield  was  treated  as  high-transilience.  Entry  into  any  of  the  other  four 
sublields  (nuclear,  CT,  magnetic  resonance,  or  digital  radiography)  by  an 
incumbent  with  experience  only  in  the  ultrasound  or  electrodiagnostic 
subfield  was  also  classed  as  high-transilience.  Other  cases  were  recorded  as 
low-transilience. 
An  incumbent’s  strength  was  based  on  two  measures,  its  total  corporate 
sales  and  its  imaging  industry  market  share.  Total  sales,  which  were  defined 
as  constant  dollar  (1967  Producer  Price  Index)  firm-wide  sales  in  the  year 
prior  to  an  entry  into  a  new  subfield,  are  a  measure  of  the  resources 
available  to  a  corporation.  To  taper  the  impact  of  very  large  sales  values,  the 
log  value  of  dollar  sales  (expressed  in  millions)  was  used.  Market  share, 
which  was  defined  as  a  firm’s  dollar-based  industry-wide  market  share  during 
the  year  before  its  entry  into  a  new  subfield,  represents  the  industry-specific 
skills  and  supporting  assets  available  to  a  firm.” 
“Analyses  were  also  carried  out  with  a  market  scope  variable,  which  recorded  the  proportion 
of  imaging  industry  subtields  in  which  a  tirm  was  participating  during  the  year  before  its  entry, 
but  the  measure  did  not  produce  independent  information  because  of  strong  correlation  with 
market  share.  A  multiplicative  interaction  between  share  and  scope,  which  emphasized  the 
strength  of  firm’s  possessing  both  high  industry  share  and  scope,  produced  results  similar  to 
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The  87  entries  into  emerging  subfields  were  accounted  for  by  47  incum- 
bents  and  the  26  alliance  entries  by  17  incumbents.  To  control  for 
idiosyncrasies  of  individual  firms’  alliance  strategies  and  for  organizational 
learning  effects,  an  additional  independent  variable  recorded  the  number  of 
times  that  an  entrant  previously  had  employed  a  pre-entry  alliance.  We  also 
recorded  the  number  of  previous  entries,  but  the  measure  was  too  strongly 
correlated  with  several  of  the  other  variables  to  provide  independent 
information. 
5.2.  Statistical  method 
Analysis  for  the  substantive  focus  of  the  study  was  performed  with  logistic 
regression.  At  the  onset,  two  alternative  methods  were  available  for  the 
analysis,  multinomial  logit  or  conditional  logit.  The  multinomial  approach 
treats  the  three  entry  modes  as  independent  choices  (standalone,  pre-entry 
distribution  alliance,  pre-entry  know-how  alliance).  The  conditional  logit 
approach,  meanwhile,  models  the  entry  decision  as  a  nested  2-step  process: 
The  incumbent  first  decides  whether  to  enter  via  an  alliance;  conditional  on 
having  chosen  to  do  so,  the  firm  then  chooses  the  alliance  type.  We  rejected 
the  conditional  logit  approach  because  we  do  not  believe  that  it  accurately 
portrays  the  decision  process,  and  adopted  the  multinomial  logic  model 
instead. 
The  basic  argument  underlying  this  research  is  that  there  are  incentives  for 
incumbents  to  enter  emerging  subfields  through  alliances  in  order  to  exploit 
existing  capabilities  or  to  overcome  perceived  deficiencies.  If  an  incumbent 
decides  to  enter  an  emerging  subfield  through  an  alliance,  the  type  of  alliance 
it  can  employ  is  strongly  influenced  by  its  resources  or  deficiencies.  If  it  has 
distribution-related  specialized  assets  that  it  can  exploit,  and  that  its 
potential  partner  finds  attractive,  it  will  enter  through  a  distribution  alliance. 
If  it  lacks  knowledge  about  the  new  subfield,  it  will  enter  through  a  know- 
how  sourcing  alliance  to  overcome  this  shortcoming.  Consequently  the 
choice  among  alliance  types  is  not  nested  or  ordered,  rendering  the 
conditional  logit  model  inappropriate.  The  entry  decision  was  modeled  as  a 
single  step  selection  between  standalone  entry,  entry  following  a  distribution 
alliance,  or  entry  following  a  know-how  sourcing  alliance. 
Analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  covariates  on  the  method  of  entry  was 
conducted  by  calculating  a  multinomial  logistic  regression  equation  of  the 
form  in  eq.  (I). 
In (Pi/P,)  =cI + BjXj?  (1) 
where  Pi  is  the  probability  of  an  event  occurring  for  the  jth  case,  which  in 
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know-how  sourcing  alliance  (i=  2).  I’,,  meanwhile,  is  the  probability  of 
standalone  entry.  Therefore  Pi/P,  represents  the  probability  of  entry  through 
type  of  alliance  i  over  the  probability  of  standalone  entry. 
For  comparison  and  for  concise  reporting,  we  also  estimated  a  binomial 
logit  model  of  all-alliances  versus  standalone  entry.  This  is  particularly  useful 
for  examining  effects  that  were  predicted  to  have  the  same  direction  of 
influence  on  the  likelihood  of  employing  both  know-how  and  distribution 
pre-entry  alliances,  such  as  the  lateness  of  entry  variable.  The  model 
comparing  all  alliances  against  no  alliances  was  run  as  a  simple  logit  model, 
with  standalone  entry  defined  as  the  base  case  (i=  1 for  both  distribution  and 
know-how  alliances). 
The  logistic  transformation  of  the  probability  linearizes  the  relationship 
between  the  probability  and  the  vector  of  covariates  Xj,  with  /Jj  representing 
the  vector  of  coefficients  and  r  representing  the  intercept.  The  estimates  were 
obtained  by  using  maximum  likelihood  routines  of  the  LOGIT  procedure  of 
LIMDEP  [Greene  (1990)].  Further  information  regarding  logistic  regression 
can  be  found  in  Hanushek  and  Jackson  (1977)  and  Maddala  (1983). 
6.  Results 
Table  2  demonstrates  that,  as  predicted  in  Hypothesis  1, interorganizatio- 
nal  alliances  are  frequently  used  by  industry  incumbents  before  their 
independent  entry  into  new  technical  subtields  of  an  industry.  Of  the  87 
market  entries  by  industry  incumbents,  26  were  preceded  by  at  least  one 
form  of  pre-entry  collaboration,  with  15  distribution  and  11  know-how 
sourcing  alliances.  The  fact  that  almost  one  in  three  incumbents  chose  to 
participate  in  a  pre-entry  alliance  demonstrates  the  caution  with  which  these 
incumbents  approached  the  potential  gains  and  risks  associated  with  stand- 
alone  entry.  By  implication,  alliances  offer  considerable  potential  access  to 
market  and  technological  information,  since  incumbents  are  unlikely  to  enter 
into  collaborative  arrangements  if  the  expected  benefits  of  such  arrangements 
were  marginal.  Nonetheless,  about  two-thirds  of  the  expanding  incumbents 
chose  not  to  participate  in  a  pre-entry  alliance.  The  tests  of  the  remaining 
hypotheses  help  identify  conditions  under  which  alliances  are  more  or  less 
likely. 
The  results  of  the  tests  of  Hypotheses  2-5  are  presented  in  table  4.13 
Consistent  with  the  raw  frequency  of  alliances,  the  negative  and  significant 
13For  conservativeness,  we  report  the  default  significance  of  the  coefficients  in  table  4  on  the 
basis  of  two-tailed  tests.  Given  that  we  have  predicted  directions  for  the  effects  of  the  variables, 
however,  interpretation  on  the  basis  of  one-tailed  tests  is  appropriate.  Hence,  coefficients  which 
are  reported  as  significant  at  the  two-tailed  0.10  level  are  significant  at  the  0.05  level  relative  to 
specific  predictions. 
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Table  4 
Logistic  regression  analyses  of  the  tendency  to  participate  in  distribution  and  know-how 
sourcing  alliances  before  expansion  (N  =87,  standard  errors  in  parentheses).“,b 
Variable 
Multinomial  logit: 
Alliance-type  versus  no  alliance 
Distribution  Know-how 
alliances  ( 15)  alliances  (11) 
Binomial  logit 
All 
alliances  (26) 
Intercept  -2.435**  -  5.349***  -  2.940*** 
(  1.207)  (1.615)  (  1.050) 
Industry  market  share  28.651*  17.821  21.8369 
(17.102)  (19.213)  (14.667) 
Corporate  size  (log  sales)  -0.013  0.275t  0.121 
(0.156)  (0.177)  (0.126) 
Lateness  of  entry  0.151**  0.153**  0.150*** 
(0.061)  (0.071)  (0.053) 
Subfield  transilience  -  2.504**  -2.0197  -2.241** 
(1.193)  (1.339)  (1.005) 
U.S.  ownership  -  0.247  1.540*  0.541 
(0.807)  (0.925)  (0.647) 
Previous  alliances  -0.367  -0.837t  -0.518t 
(0.417)  (0.610)  (0.387) 
Model  I*  (df)  21.3(12)**  16.5(6)** 
Overall  fit  (Alliance  tit)  78%(4/15;4jll)  77”/:, (  10,‘26) 
a*p<O.lO;  **p<O.OS;  ***p<O.Ol  (two-tailed  tests);  tpcO.10. 
“Coeffjcients  show  effects  of  covariates  for  each  alliance  type  relative  to  effects  that  the 
covariates  have  for  the  base  category,  standalone  entry. 
intercepts  of  the  models  for  distribution,  know-how,  and  all  alliances  indicate 
that,  on  average,  alliances  were  not  used.  Controlling  for  that  factor,  the 
signs  and  significance  of  the  coefficients  are  largely  consistent  with  the 
predicted  effects.  Moreover,  each  of  the  models  shown  has  significant 
explanatory  power,  demonstrated  by  the  significance  of  the  model  x2 
statistics.14 
Although  the  overall  predictive  fit  of  each  model  is  high  (77%  of  the  cases), 
only  27  to  38%  of  the  active  events,  that  is,  entry  through  alliances,  could  be 
predicted.  The  relative  weakness  of  the  models  reflects  the  small  number  of 
distribution  and  know-how  alliances  included  in  the  data.  Because  the 
research  was  not  geared  towards  the  development  of  a  comprehensive 
predictive  model,  the  relatively  low  prediction  of  active  events  was  not 
deemed  to  be  a  major  problem  for  the  study.  Instead,  our  primary  interest 
lies  in  the  reported  tests  of  individual  hypotheses. 
Hypothesis  2  predicted  that  strong  industry  incumbents  would  be  more 
14Twice  the  difference  between  the  loglikelihood  values  of  the  full  and  intercept-only  models  is 
distributed  as  a  x2  statistic  with  degrees  of  freedom  equal  to  the  difference  in  the  number  of 
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likely  to  participate  in  pre-entry  alliances.  The  results  reported  show  that  one 
measure  of  incumbent  strength,  market  share,  is  associated  with  participation 
in  distribution  alliances  and  the  second  measure  of  strength,  total  corporate 
sales,  is  marginally  associated  with  participation  in  know-how  alliances.  The 
association  between  market  share  and  distribution  probably  occurs  because 
of  the  broad  distribution  and  service  systems  possessed  by  high  share 
imaging  industry  firms.  The  relationship  between  corporate  size  and  know- 
how  alliances,  meanwhile,  is  likely  to  be  the  result  of  large  corporations 
having  more  resources  available  with  which  to  undertake  minority  invest- 
ment,  joint  ventures,  and  other  such  alliances  requiring  outlay  of  resources. 
In  the  all-alliance  model,  the  effect  of  incumbent  strength  is  most  strongly 
associated  with  the  market  share  variab1e.r’ 
Hypothesis  3  predicted  that  entrants  which  enter  later  would  be  more 
likely  to  participate  in  pre-entry  alliances.  The  expected  result  is  shown  in 
table  4  for  distribution,  know-how,  and  all  alliances.  Firms  which  choose  to 
enter  early  in  the  history  of  a  new  subfield  accepted  the  uncertainty  of 
standalone  entry,  possibly  because  they  had  fewer  potential  partners. 
Hypotheses  4(a)  and  4(b)  predicted  that  when  incumbents  expand  into 
subtields  which  require  new  supporting  products  they  will  be  less  likely  to 
participate  in  pre-entry  distribution  alliances,  but  just  as  likely  to  participate 
in  pre-entry  know-how  alliances.  The  expected  results  were  found  for  the 
distribution  case,  as  shown  by  the  negative  coefficient  of  the  subfield 
transilience  variable  in  table  4.  Having  less  to  offer  potential  partners, 
industry  incumbents  are  less  likely  to  distribute  another  manufacturer’s 
goods  before  carrying  out  independent  entry  into  high-transilience  subfields. 
However,  contrary  to  the  Hypothesis  4(b),  firms  making  high  transilience 
moves  also  proved  to  be  marginally  less  likely  to  enter  into  know-how 
sourcing  alliances  than  those  making  low  transilience  moves,  although  the 
strength  of  the  effect  is  slightly  less  than  in  the  know-how  sourcing  case.  It  is 
possible  that  these  firms  were  less  attractive  allies,  relative  to  low  transilience 
incumbents,  and  therefore  attracted  fewer  offers.  Despite  the  greater  need  for 
these  firms  to  enter  into  alliances,  the  relative  unattractiveness  of  these 
incumbents  may  have  resulted  in  fewer  alliances  being  effected. 
Another  aspect  of  the  new  supporting  asset  case  is  highlighted  by  the  high 
correlation  between  the  transilience  and  years  before  entry  variables,  as 
noted  in  table  3.  When  new  supporting  assets  must  be  acquired,  entry  tends 
to  take  place  later  than  when  the  value  of  existing  supporting  assets  carries 
over  to  new  core  products,  indicating  that  the  relative  absence  of  supporting 
“Models  that  omitted  the  size  variable  produced  similar  results,  although  with  weaker 
predictive  power.  The  nonsignificant  positive  relationship  between  market  share  and  know-how 
alliances  become  significant  in  the  reduced  model.  This  result  follows  from  the  positive 
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assets  is  a  constraint  for  firms  contemplating  entry  into  related  sublields. 
This  again  speaks  to  the  caution  with  which  firms  expand,  even  when 
innovation  takes  place  within  the  broadly-defined  industry  in  which  the  firm 
already  participates. 
Hypothesis  5,  which  postulates  that  American-owned  incumbents  will  be 
less  likely  than  foreign-owned  incumbents  to  participate  in  alliances,  was 
rejected.  The  expected  negative  coefficient  was  found  for  distribution 
alliances,  but  at  a  non-significant  level,  so  that  foreign-owned  incumbents 
appear  to  be  at  least  as  likely  as  domestic  firms  to  attract  distribution 
alliance  partners  on  the  basis  of  their  supporting  assets.  Contrary  to 
Hypothesis  5,  however,  U.S.  firms  were  more  likely  to  enter  into  know-how 
alliances  than  other  firms.  With  more  medical  equipment  sector  manu- 
facturers  based  in  the  U.S.  than  in  any  other  country  [Dummer  and 
Robertson  (1966)  American  Hospital  Association  (1966),  Directory  Systems, 
Inc.  (1986)  Hale  and  Hale  (1986)],  it  may  be  that  an  American  ownership 
base  provides  better  information  about  potential  partners.‘” 
Finally,  control  for  the  number  of  previous  entries  into  emerging  sublields 
that  were  preceded  by  alliances  was  marginally  significant  for  know-how 
sourcing  alliances,  but  not  for  distribution  alliances.  The  negative  sign  of  the 
effect  is  intriguing.  It  appears  that  firms  which  have  experience  with  know- 
how  alliances  are  slightly  less  likely  to  use  them  again,  possibly  because  of 
dissatisfaction  with  the  results  of  past  alliances.  This  result  must  be 
interpreted  cautiously,  owing  to  the  strong  correlation  between  the  previous 
entries  and  market  share  variables.  The  previous  alliance  result  implies  that, 
among  firms  with  large  market  shares,  experience  with  previous  know-how 
alliances  tends  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  pursuing  another  alliance. 
The  general  weakness  of  the  previous  alliance  results  is  also  interesting. 
There  appears  to  be  relatively  little  firm-specific  rigidity  of  alliance  be- 
haviour.  Instead,  the  incumbents  in  the  sample  tended  to  vary  their  alliance 
strategies  on  the  basis  of  product  and  subfield  characteristics.  This  may  be 
due  to  organizational  and  external  factors  such  as  the  limited  capacity  of  the 
firm’s  channels,  its  marketing  and  corporate  strategies  which  may  impose 
product-market  consistency  requirements,  and  constraints  imposed  by  the 
allied  firm  which  may  set  limits  on  the  number  of  lines  that  its  incumbent 
partner  may  distribute. 
Although  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  the  incentives  for  industry 
incumbents  to  undertake  pre-entry  alliances,  we  found  it  informative  to 
investigate  the  partners  to  the  alliances.  Our  estimate  is  that  the  primary 
purpose  for  the  partner  in  the  distribution  alliances  was  entering  a  foreign 
market,  about  half  of  the  entries  being  into  the  U.S.  and  half  being  Europe 
“In  addition,  contingency  table  tests  revealed  no  significant  differences  between  use  of 
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or  Japan.  r7  The  sole  purpose  for  the  know-alliances,  from  a  partner’s  point 
of  view,  was  expansion  in  the  industry. 
We  also  investigated  whether  the  partners  and  incumbents  in  the  26 
alliances  continued  to  participate  in  the  industry  at  the  end  of  the  study, 
finding  a  bias  in  favour  of  incumbent  survival.  Only  9  partners  remained, 
while  15  incumbents  continued  to  participate.  (In  only  3  cases  did  the 
partner  survive  and  the  incumbent  exit,  while  the  converse  occurred  in  9 
cases.)  The  only  type  of  alliance  which  tended  to  be  associated  with  partner 
survival  was  market  entry  into  the  United  States,  where  4  of  5  partners 
continued  to  participate. 
7.  Discussion  and  conclusion 
Most  of  the  predictions  presented  in  this  paper  have  been  supported, 
although  sometimes  at  marginal  levels  of  statistical  significance.  Strong 
incumbents  are  more  likely  than  weak  players  to  participate  in  pre-entry 
interorganizational  alliances,  with  high  market  share  being  associated  with 
distribution  alliances  and  larger  corporate  size  with  know-how  sourcing 
alliances.  Similarly,  later  entrants  are  more  likely  to  participate  in  pre-entry 
alliances.  When  major  changes  are  required  to  supporting  assets,  incumbents 
are  less  likely  to  participate  in  distribution  alliances  and,  opposite  our 
expectations,  in  know-how  sourcing  alliances.  Contrary  to  conventional 
wisdom  (and  our  prediction),  American  tirms  appear  to  be  no  less  likely  than 
their  foreign-owned  competitors  to  distribute  another  manufacturer’s  product 
before  undertaking  independent  entry  and  are  more  likely  to  engage  in  a  pre- 
entry  know-how  sourcing  alliance. 
These  results  provide  two  main  contributions.  First,  empirical  support  has 
been  provided  for  the  claim  that  a  firm’s  possession  of  key  supporting  assets 
will  influence  its  strategy  as  it  attempts  to  realize  the  returns  from  innovation 
[Teece  (1986),  Clark  (1987)].  We  have  shown  that  alliance  strategy  will  vary, 
depending  on  an  industry  incumbent’s  prior  strength  and  on  the  disruption 
to  the  value  of  existing  supporting  assets.  The  relevance  of  Abernathy  and 
Clark’s  (1985)  conceptual  transilience  map  has  been  demonstrated.  The 
results  are  particularly  strong  owing  to  the  inclusiveness  of  our  sampling 
procedure  -  we  compare  cases  in  which  alliances  have  been  undertaken  to 
those  in  which  they  were  not,  rather  than  studying  only  cases  in  which 
alliances  have  been  formed  and  so  risking  sample  selection  bias.  The  results 
are  robust,  given  the  few  degrees  of  freedom  available. 
Much  further  work  remains  to  explore  the  supporting  assets  issue.  For 
instance,  the  concept  of  supporting  assets  usefulness  could  be  applied  to 
“The  incumbent  members  of  the  foreign  entry  alliances.  which  by  delinition  already 
participated  in  the  U.S.  imaging  industry  before  entering  into  the  alliance,  subsequently 
expanded  into  the  U.S.  market  for  the  new  goods. 368  W.  Mitchell  and  K.  Singh,  Incumbents’  use  of  pre-entry  alliances 
investigating  diversification  moves  -  seemingly  unrelated  diversification  could 
be  explained  by,  or  evaluated  against,  the  criteria  of  core  and  supporting 
assets  similarity.  Coupling  supporting  asset  value  with  related  concepts  of 
strategic  variety  [Prahalad  and  Bettis  (1987)],  technological  discontinuities 
[Tushman  and  Anderson  (1986)],  and  technological  paradigms  [Dosi  (1982)] 
may  improve  explanation  of  the  strategy  and  performance  of  diversifying 
firms. 
The  second  contribution  is  to  the  emerging  literature  on  inter- 
organizational  alliances.  The  results  show  that  collaborative  ventures  are  an 
important  means  employed  by  some  types  of  incumbents  to  test  the  technical 
and  market  waters  of  emerging  subfields,  prior  to  their  full  entry  as  systems 
manufacturers.  This  appears  to  be  a  rational  strategy  for  leading  incumbents, 
allowing  them  to  leverage  their  specialized  assets  and  gain  access  to  market 
and  product  information,  while  spreading  risks  in  uncertain  conditions.  The 
general  pattern  of  results  provides  a  rational  perspective  of  alliance  between 
firms. 
The  results  also  raise  welfare  implications.  Contrary  to  the  often  unfavor- 
able  portrayal  of  firms  and  managers  engaging  in  power  building  and  market 
constraint  through  interorganizational  arrangements  [Pfeffer  and  Salancik 
(197841,  the  results  are  consistent  with  an  interpretation  of  relatively  efficient 
risk  reduction  and  know-how  acquisition.  Access  to  an  incumbent’s  distribu- 
tion  system  or  contribution  by  an  incumbent  of  minority  investment  may 
increase  the  ability  of  a  new  entrant  to  participate  in  an  emerging  field.  Such 
entry  may  well  promote  competition,  technological  innovation,  and  develop- 
ment  within  the  field.  At  the  same  time,  participation  by  the  incumbent  may 
help  provide  legitimacy  for  the  fledgling  field,  and  so  provide  an  umbrella  for 
innovative  industry  newcomers.  This  interpretation  is  limited  by  the  narrow 
scope  of  the  present  study;  clearly,  the  area  merits  further  research. 
The  study  has  necessarily  narrow  limits,  largely  imposed  by  its  30  year 
retrospective  collection  of  data.  Many  environmental  and  firm  specific  factors 
which  influence  the  decision  to  participate  in  alliances  have  not  been 
addressed  in  this  paper.  These  include  an  incumbent’s  broad  corporate 
strategy,  its  performance,  the  amount  of  slack  resources  available,  effective- 
ness  of  internal  R&D,  and  perceptions  of  its  management,  as  well  as 
environmental  factors  such  as  the  size  and  growth  rates  of  the  existing  and 
new  subtields  and  the  competitiveness  of  the  industry.  These  variables  could 
beneficially  be  incorporated  into  future  research.  Moreover,  it  would  be 
useful  to  contrast  this  study  with  cases  when  incumbents  employed  pre-entry 
alliances  and  then  chose  not  to  enter.  It  would  also  be  interesting  to  study 
the  post-entry  performance  of  the  firms  following  standalone  expansion  and 
pre-entry  alliance  strategies.  Survival  and  other  performance  differentials 
would  provide  useful  information  on  the  efficacy  of  the  different  entry 
mechanisms,  and  help  clarify  the  role  that  specialized  assets  play  in  the W.  Mitchell  and  K.  Singh,  Incumbents’  use  ofpre-entry  alliances  369 
choice  among  entry  methods.  Finally,  research  integrating  characteristics  of 
incumbents’  allies  would  provide  a  fuller  picture  of  the  factors  which 
influence  use  of  alliances. 
Although  limited  in  its  scope,  the  results  of  the  study  are  important.  We 
have  described  several  of  the  key  implications  above.  In  addition,  part  of  the 
substance  of  the  findings  relates  to  the  potential  that  they  will  differ  in  future 
environments,  because  there  is  no  assurance  that  all  the  factors  identified  in 
this  retrospective  study  will  have  the  same  influence  in  the  future.  In 
particular,  the  tendency  to  avoid  participation  in  alliances  early  in  the 
development  of  a  new  subfield  may  be  a  relic  of  the  past.  The  U.S.  market 
for  diagnostic  imaging  devices  is  facing  the  same  increase  in  global  com- 
petition  that  is  occurring  in  most  other  industrial  sectors.  With  the  rise  of 
new  competitors,  leading  incumbents  may  be  forced  to  enter  new  subtields 
more  quickly  than  in  the  past  [Mitchell  (1989)].  Incumbents  that  rely  on 
standalone  entry  in  conditions  of  high  technical  uncertainty  may  well  face 
serious  competitive  disadvantages,  relative  to  entrants  that  combine  internal 
development  with  interorganizational  alliances  [Pointer  et  al  (1988),  Hamel 
et  al.  (1989)  Powell  (1990)].  Thus,  firms  which  hope  to  prosper  in  competi- 
tive  environments  may  have  to  seek  out  alliance  partners  long  before 
technical  and  market  uncertainties  have  subsided.  Interorganizational 
alliances  will  continue  to  be  important,  and  new  skills  will  have  to  be 
acquired  in  order  to  use  them  to  prosper. 
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